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IC 75-1408
19 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Concerning a Response to General Faurer's
Progress Report to the DCI on the Strategic
Warning Staff

REFERENCE: Memo for the DCI from General Faurer
of 13 March 1975

1. You have asked us to prepare a response to the referenced memorandum, and I wish to call your attention to two subjects which should perhaps be addressed in that response: (a) the establishment of the D/DCI/IC's USIB working group to review the functioning of the strategic warning process; and (b) some problems already apparent in the functioning of the Strategic Warning Committee.

2. Concerning the first, DCID 1/5, "Strategic Warning," stipulates in paragraph 6, captioned Review, "The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC) is hereby assigned responsibility for the formation of a USIB working group to review the functioning of the strategic warning process and to report periodically--at least annually--to the USIB on its findings." I think that it is probably time for you to establish this group and to so inform both the DCI and General Faurer. My suggestion would be that, under your chairmanship, PRD be given this function for the IC Staff, that under your signature we ask the USIB Principals to designate members of the group, that a secretary of the committee be appointed from PRD, and that Belden and myself be designated as members. *Agree (w)*

3. I would urge that among the first items to be considered by the working group should be the second issue mentioned above, i. e., an existing problem, specifically the tendency of the SW Staff to exceed the limits of its charter. The Watch Committee did this increasingly

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over the years, and it became one of the principal problems associated with that committee. And now, in its informal publication called Strategic Warning Staff Alert List, which seems to be appearing more than once a week, the SWC is in effect producing another NIC Watch Officers' Notes. And substantive coverage is very broad. For example, in just one issue (14 March):

--There are items concerning Moscow's pleasure at the turn of events in Portugal; a question concerning what steps Moscow is taking to strengthen its position in post-Tito Yugoslavia; a statement that Moscow is not happy about the rightward drift in West German foreign policy and could "dig its heels" in on Berlin; and a note that an Egyptian destroyer has completed the first transit of the Suez Canal since 1967 by a major combatant vessel.

--Concerning countries of more immediate significance to the strategic warning function, there are (properly) notes on Soviet military exercises. But there is also a statement that the Strategic Warning Staff will have a continuing interest in changes in Soviet leadership insofar as these changes may bring about changes in Soviet foreign policy; and a number of very political questions--e.g., are there signs of political maneuvering in the Soviet leadership? Do the recent shifts of young Gromyko from Washington and Abrasimov from Moscow have any significance?

--The single item concerning China deals with Chinese petroleum exploration in the offshore areas to the south of China. And the single note on North Korea reports that Kim Il-Sung may be grooming his son as his successor.

4. DCID 1/5 says that it is the responsibility of the SWC "to carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all sources which might provide strategic warning." It defines strategic warning "as the earliest possible warning that the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the PRC, or North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its military capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten military confrontation with the US." It takes no great stretch of the imagination to recognize that

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items of the character cited above--e.g., Soviet pleasure about developments in Portugal--bear no real relationship to strategic warning as defined in the DCID. Further, it is clear that if ten analysts on the Strategic Warning Staff are going to try to cover current intelligence on pretty much the world at large, then they are likely to (a) neglect their duties as specialists on the problem of strategic warning; (b) duplicate the work of many professional analysts elsewhere in the community; and (c) divert and distort the functions of the SWC. At least, insofar as this Division is concerned, and OCI as well, a principal reason for abolishing the whole Watch Committee was to eliminate this unnecessary and debilitating kind of unfocused world coverage.

5. I certainly do not propose that all of this be put in a response from the DCI to General Faurer. But I think it could be mentioned in general and polite terms, and I think it should be a matter of discussion for the USIB working group. In any event, I want to get your reaction to these matters before we attempted to reply to General Faurer.



Chief, PRD/IC

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 24 March 1975
TO		
ROOM		
REMARKS:		
<p>Dick:</p> <p>These are helpful suggestions. Very much on the mark. Question: should you or I be the one to bring this up first with Linc Faurer?</p> <p>Please proceed with a memo which establishes the monitoring group as you sugg</p>		
<p style="text-align: right;">[Redacted Signature]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Samuel V. Wilson Lieutenant General, USA</p>		
FROM:		I/DCL/IC
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

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